<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Zero Trust on Mexicali IT</title><link>https://mxlit.com/technologies/zero-trust/</link><description>Recent content in Zero Trust on Mexicali IT</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 16:20:00 -0700</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://mxlit.com/technologies/zero-trust/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Zero-Trust Endpoint Isolation: Containment via Offline SIDs</title><link>https://mxlit.com/kb-00088/</link><pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 16:20:00 -0700</pubDate><guid>https://mxlit.com/kb-00088/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;When a user is terminated in &lt;strong&gt;Active Directory&lt;/strong&gt;, the first line of defense is instantly engaged: denial of corporate access, which disconnects their VPN sessions and blocks interactive logins through the Domain Controller (DC).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there is a critical risk vector. If the employee (or a malicious attacker) has their corporate laptop, the local Windows &lt;code&gt;Cached Credentials&lt;/code&gt; will continue to operate. This allows them to log into the machine &amp;ldquo;offline&amp;rdquo; (from the domain) and &lt;strong&gt;extract sensitive files locally onto a USB drive&lt;/strong&gt; without needing to be connected to the corporate VPN or internal network.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>